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Kiangsi, and Kwangtung were being amalgamated with the predominant Han culture, Honan and northern Hupeh were being subjected to alien influences. The nomads from the north and west of China ruled the North for most of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Again, from 907 to 1279, it was largely under alien, nomadic rule.[19]

Some differences between North and South in dress, spoken language, and habits of daily life did arise from this separation of China and the admixture of its culture with two alien cultures. Also, the long years of division developed a consciousness within North and South of their separate identities and some antagonism between the regions which has never been eradicated. These differences should not be stressed too much, however. Sufficient numbers of the old families stayed in the north to fill most of the administrative jobs under the alien dynasties and instill Chinese

19. The best accounts of the nomadic conquest and rule of North China are: Eberhard, op. cit., pp. 110-77, 207-39; Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952, pp. 64-120; and Karl A. Wittfogel, Feng Chia-sheng, et al. History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), issued as Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n. s. 36, 1946, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1949.

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values and forms of organization in the conquerors.[20] Moreover, since the Mongol conquest of China in 1279, the country has been almost continuously united until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Taiping Rebellion opened the way for an upsurge of provincial autonomy.

III. THE MODERN PERIOD

A. Political and Social Upheaval

The last hundred years of China's history have been marked by great social and political upheaval. The shape these movements took can be almost wholly attributed to the impact of the modern West. Beginning in the nineteenth century, economic and military penetration made wide inroads into the economy and political control of China. Along with this intrusion came new religious and secular ideas that worked to undermine Chinese loyalty toward

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20. Eberhard, A History of China, pp. 178-79, makes much of the differences that grew between North and South during the first period of division. In his Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 65-121, however, Eberhard demonstrates the persistance of the Chinese culture and political administration in the North under alien rule. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Cambridge, England, The Unversity Press, 1954, Vol. I, page 119, minimizes the difference that grew out of the period of division.

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SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

The Chinese imperial system was strikingly successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere, but local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia, did not lose all their characteristic traits. In the Central-South Region, for example, the oldest "Chinese" area was Honan, a land-locked agricultural region. When, centuries later, the coastal areas of Kwangtung were absorbed by imperial China, the terrain and climate, the dependence on the seas and rivers for livelihood, meant that a way of life, a culture markedly different from any in North China, persisted and developed. A rough analogy may be drawn with Western Europe. Many basic attitudes and values are common to "Christian Europe" from Sicility to the Arctic, yet history and geography have made this area diverse in customs and ways of life. The diversity is less in the 1,000-mile long arc of Central-South China, partly because its cultures were never set off from one another by the nation-state boundaries that divide modern Europe.

There are other factors which give to most of the area we are now considering important uniformities in culture. The expansion of "Chinese culture" from Honan into the whole of south China was essentially the steady outward push of an efficient agricultural technique which displaced the more primitive aboriginal food-gatherers and primitive slash-burn agri-

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Annex "A," Subparagraph li, Sociological Background

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

Intellectual and artistic expression is interpreted in this chapter to mean the communication of experience and ideas through the media of creative and academic writing, painting, the plastic arts, dancing, and music. 532 538

The bulk of the creative and academic writing of the Central-South Region does not differ from that produced in China as a whole. The Chinese written language is the vehicle for official business and cultivated expression in all parts of China. In the past, cities like Changsha, Hankow, Nanchang, and Canton in Central-South China closely followed the cultural interests of Shanghai and Peking, and innovations derived from leaders in Shanghai and Peking, upon receiving support from people in these Central-South cities, appear to have been accepted nationally. The identification of the bulk of the creative and academic writings of the Central-South Region with that of the Chinese nation is particularly true today when the nation is ruled by an authoritarian government and when all cultural innovations emanate from Peking.

The Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists, often speak of literature and the arts as one. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains to literature also pertains to the other arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

In less sophisticated folk literature and folk art, however, the Central-South exhibits some unique regional characteristics. But even in this respect, the Central-South Region is by no means an integrated 532 538 184

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whole: Honan is more closely related to the North China tradition, and is oriented toward Hopei rather than toward the provinces in the south; Hupeh, Hunan, and Kiangsi are oriented toward the provinces east of them rather than toward their northern and southern neighbors; Kwangtung and Kwangsi have South China characteristics not shared by other provinces in the region. Furthermore, Kwangsi and the western border of Hunan have been settled by minority groups as well as the Han Chinese. These minority groups have forms of intellectual and artistic expression unlike those of the Han Chinese.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942 [1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all writers and artists in the nation to the service of the state. Control and regimentation of thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communists consolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the intentional and unceasing use of literary and art criticism to keep writers and artists in line. Now, however, the scope is national.

1. Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the

(see next page)

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poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, professional stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

A. Farmers

The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with that of rich merchants, are all but non-existent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists of chiefly the poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. In fact, their mode of living tends to confine their interest to their own villages or to the limited area defined by the dialect they speak. A Cantonese farmer may feel as alien in Peking as in a foreign land. The farmers are only affected by the pressure of government taxation and legislation. Only in those areas overrun by invaders is the spirit of nationalism apt to arise. This was found to be true in Honan, Hupeh, and Hunan provinces, and in parts of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Kwangsi during World War II.

The Communists have made persistent efforts to "educate and propagandize" the farmers. The farmers in Hunan Province, for example, derive a large measure of pride and satisfaction from the knowledge that one of their fellow Hunanese, Mao Tse-tung, has become the leader of the nation. However, the fact that the farmers as a class have learned

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a few political terms as a result of Communist propaganda does not mean that they have developed a strong national feeling. Some of the farmers may regard the Communist effort to "educate" them as unwelcome interference. The younger farmers show a more favorable response to Communist propaganda.

The idea that he is to be given land in a manner to which he is totally unaccustomed probably has generated apprehension in even the poorest peasant who believed he wanted to be a landowner. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction. However, there is evidence that grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the marketing of farm produce have met a great amount of resistance. The poor farmer in China today is less happy than he was in the days immediately after the Communist land reform. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy toward the farmer may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm. Available reports show that neither the government nor the farmer is satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far, nor with the manner in which this work is done. Where disaster strikes, farmers still die helplessly, as such was the case recently reported in Kwangtung.[1] Although starvation is by no means unprecedented in China, failure to prevent starvation alienates support from the present regime. On the other hand, some improvement in his life may induce the farmer to feel favorably disposed toward the government.

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The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign culture is derived from contact with foreign mission-

1. Ya-chou Tien-hsun [Asia Foundation Bulletin], San Francisco, Oct. 21, 1955, p. 6.

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aries. At one time foreign churches were established in all parts of Central-South China except a few of the remote districts along the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border and in western Kwangsi. Government efforts to foster xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultranationalistic segment of the Chinese elite, dated from the nineteenth century. Some farmers in this region, particularly those in Hunan and Honan, are like to remember, for instance, the stories about the Boxer's Rebellion, which terrorized many foreigners. With relish, the Communists are re-telling such stories as specimens of "anti-imperialistic" expressions of the Chinese people. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries on the Mainland. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may chuckle at the thought of the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

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The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring land, provide a better education for his children, and maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the social ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmers to look more kindly upon the present regime.

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Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population -- the members of secret societies, for example, are traditionally opposed to government control. Farmers active in these groups may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings in which secret societies played an important part indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctively anti-foreign or anti-government characteristics. Others may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state.

B. Urban Workers

The group feeling of organized workers was aroused as early as the 1920's in industrial centers like Chengchow, Hankow, and Canton, where organized labor was involved in many political movements The worker realized that he was "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that he had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the nation and its sumbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communist policy to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He is likely to feel a sense of achievement when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also

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add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, in spite of the fact that such "benefits" remain largely promises.

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On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are the lack of wage increases, a harsher work sechedule and loss of leisure time, and a visionary welfare program for the worker which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well he can put up with the physical hardship of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the worker too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class which is being fostered by the Communists and which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

C. Students and Intellectuals

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Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

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Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity among nations. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in government where they might attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals still harboring such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

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The Communists have counted on the enthusiastic support of students. From among the students the Communists recruit their loyal cadres. Exposure to regimentation may lessen the student enthusiasm for the Communist regime. Although anti-Communist sources in Hong Kong have reported a sharp decrease in the number of overseas Chinese students returning to the Mainland, the fact that some continue to return to China indicates the strong appeal of Communist ideology to literate Chinese youth. The Communists, however, may be expecting too much of their program of indoctrination; the young may give loyal support to a totalitarian regime, but it is unlikely that they can entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

D. Businessmen and Industrialists

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Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist, although in reduced number. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sound-phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of state could evoke intimate sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers, except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation of the Chinese economy.

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Under the Peking regime, business men and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small-business men and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the New Democracy; and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist construction, which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of state enterprises. There is evidence that the business men and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government much too strict, making it increasingly difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures.

If profit has been the most common motive among business men and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their careers. The more adaptable have escaped the wave of purges by co-operating with the Communist regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential financiers and industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide the manufacturers some slight hope.

An aditional factor to provoke dislike for the regime among merchants and manufacturers is the

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control on foreign trade. Merchants in Kwangtung cannot acquire cheap imported consumer goods to which they had had access under the former regime. The control on smuggling meets disfavor among Kwangtung merchants who live along the international border. 441 184

E. Women

The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "rights"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists. 562 184

To the "emancipated" belongs the responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have exchanged one form of drudgery for another are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men of equal education and comparable environment. In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of "patriotism."

How much improvement in the status of the women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities; more tangibly and closer to their daily life, they are given child care, adult education, and other welfare benefits if they join the working froce. If the increase in the number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the

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Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women who undertook factory-work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice. 562 184

The much-publicized marriage law in Communist China embodies nothing new, but its vigorous and arbitrary enforcement is unprecedented. Even this Communist law has engendered mixed feelings among the women; acceptance will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China. (See discussion of the marriage law in the chapter on The Family.)

Some women hold high posts in government, and "labor heroines" are found in all industries. Housewives of well-to-do families in larger cities may live in leisure, but those of families of modest means may have to work outside the home and do not resent it as long as their work is not heavy or of manual in character. This means that the Communists have to continue their indoctrination of women to respect and enjoy labor. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reactions of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; younger women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

F. National Minorities

The minority groups in China have never felt any great loyalty toward the larger political entity 563 184

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of China. Occasionally they have been made aware that a distant government claimed control over them; but most of the time they ignored the existence of the national government and were only annoyed by the local government's interference.

It is a Communist policy to cultivate a feeling of kinship between these groups and the Han-Chinese. The government's approaches, so far, have been mild and friendly. The effort to help the minority groups develop their own languages may serve to decrease the tension between the minorities and the Han-Chinese. The offer of more opportunities for the education and advancement of minorities will contribute to the growht of a "greater China." In Central-South China, where he minority groups have had no self-sufficient culture to challenge the superiority of the Han-Chinese, conflict between the Communists and the minorities is not likely to result. The key to the Communists' success or failure will depend upon their ability to ful fill the promises they have made to the minorities. The Communists claim credit for economic improvement in the minority areas but we have no certain proof that permanent changes have been made.

Even if we assume that the Communists have done all they promised to do, there is still a possibility of dissatisfaction among minority groups. Although most of the Chuang people (in Kwangsi Province) and the Miao people (in Hunan Province) have been assimilated by neighboring Han-Chinese, some may regard recent changes as an intrusion and resent the dictates of government "cadres."

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F. Other Groups

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In addition to the groups discussed, there are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have some bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibit intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause." They work to strengthen the machine which brought them to power, thereby making certain that they will not be deposed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, there have been a few signs of antagonism among the leaders. A purge as violent as that which took place in Russia in the 1930's at present cannot be predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude the development discord among Party leaders.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism. The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. In Kwangtung

Province, there are more new members in local Party and Government bureaus. There are possibly more "opportunists" among the new members who joined the Party because they saw a chance for personal advancement. These people are undoubtedly more susceptible to discontent than those who joined the Party before it came to power. On the other hand, the old Party cadres may be provoked to discontent by the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for promotion.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more virulently than it does "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

G. Conclusion

The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the

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Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to the Soviet destroys the spirit of nationalism which Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. There is evidence that Peking is attempting to reduce the possibility of friction between the Russians and the Chinese without damaging the ideological kinship and the diplomatic relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The activities of the wide-spread Sino-Russian Friendship Association, and the continual propaganda on Russian aid to Communist China, indicate a sustained effort to create a favorable attitude toward Soviet Russia.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so various in temperament as the Chinese.